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Abstract
This paper develops a model which explains how combining into a futures
clearinghouse allows traders to economize on margin, and how such a
combination will set margin levels for the benefit of the traders as a whole.
We also provide evidence which supports the predictions of this model. Our
theory implies that the clearinghouse will set margins as a function of the
volatility of the futures price and the opportunity cost associated with
holding margin assets. Previous studies focus on the impact of volatility.
Most of these studies use historical measures of volatility. In this paper we
use the implied volatility derived from futures option prices to measure the
volatility which the market anticipates in the futures price.

I . INTRODUCTION
The literature on margin has two strands: the usefulness of margin
levels as a public policy tool to control excess volatility; and the private
interest in setting margin levels to provide adequate protection against
default. This paper addresses the second strand, usually referred to as
prudential margin setting. We demonstrate empirically that margin levels
reflect both prudential concerns and the opportunity cost of margin deposits.
Our model contributes to the literature by explicitly incorporating the cost
of margin deposits and demonstrating the tradeoff between these costs and
prudential concerns
.
By providing a contract guarantee, the clearinghouse pools default risk
among members. Levels of margin and other deposits serve as collateral to
protect the clearinghouse: the higher the deposits, the greater the
protection. The opportunity cost of margin deposits constrains the level of
protection which the members will regard as optimal. This optimality
condition is met when the opportunity cost of margin is equal to the increment
of protection obtained from the deposit of additional margin.
Two alternative models are provided: one with constant and one with
increasing opportunity costs. If the marginal cost of margin is constant, our
model predicts that the level of margin protection chosen by the clearinghouse
is determined by opportunity costs but is independent of volatility. With
increasing costs of margin, the clearinghouse is motivated to increase its
share of risk as volatility increases.
Our empirical work tests these hypotheses at three levels. Our sample
consists of a series of cross sections of eighteen futures contracts having
associated futures options. We construct coverage ratios by dividing required
margin by the futures price volatility (in dollar terms). A coverage ratio of
three, for instance, indicates that a price change must be three standard
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deviations from the mean to exhaust margin. The estimates of volatility are
based on option prices, and thus reflect a market-consensus forecast of
volatility. The coverage ratio expresses the level of loss protection
provided by a given level of margin, in a form which can be compared over time
and across contracts.
We first examine the hypothesis that margin levels are positively
associated with the level of expected volatility using cross-section
regressions at each date in the sample. This re-examines previous tests of
prudentiality by Gay, Hunter and Kolb (1986). Our evidence confirms their
finding that margin levels increase with volatility, as is consistent with
prudentiality. Our next test examines the time series of daily coverage
ratios for four contracts to determine how coverage ratios are adjusted in
response to shocks. The evidence of this section confirms GHK's finding that
coverages are increased when coverage ratios are lower than their
unconditional means. These tests also demonstrate that clearinghouses lower
coverage when margin coverage is excessive. This result was not predicted by
the previous literature, but is predicted by our model.
Our third series of tests examines the cross section pooled over the
sample period. Our results are consistent with the clearinghouse adjusting
margin levels to allow for the opportunity cost of margin. Our regressions
indicate that margin coverage is negatively related to economy-wide shifts in
the opportunity cost of margin deposits and also negatively related to
participant- specific shifts in participants' borrowing needs as proxied by the
levels of implied standard deviation. The results are consistent with margin
levels having increasing costs for market participants. Sensitivity tests are
conducted for the possibility that margins are a fixed proportion of the
futures price, or a fixed value. The results favor our model over these
alternatives
.
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II. A MODEL OF PRUDENTIAL MARGINS
In this model, the clearinghouse acts as a club, that is, a voluntary
organization which furthers the joint interests of its members by
internalizing some of the externalities which would otherwise exist between
members. The role of the club in the provision of club goods is similar to
that of a local government in the provision of local public goods, but
membership in clubs is strictly voluntary, and non-members can be costlessly
excluded from the benefits of club membership.
A futures clearinghouse allows its members to exploit a variety of
economies of scale accessible only by acting as a group. A centralized
clearinghouse simplifies recordkeeping, since members need only keep track of
their net position with the clearinghouse. Credit monitoring and control is
simplified, since a member's financial standing need only be assessed once by
the clearinghouse, rather than separately by each trading partner. A central
clearinghouse can take margin on the net position of a member, rather than on
each separate trade. There are economies of scope between record keeping and
credit control, since knowledge of a member's net position is necessary to
assess his exposure. In addition, because exchange members precommit to
binding arbitration, disputes are no longer a matter for bilateral bargaining,
and are thus settled at lower average cost to members as a group (see Moser,
1993)
.
Most models which incorporate the exchange or the clearinghouse as an
economic agent assume that the organization is profit maximizing. Frequently,
profits are assumed to be positively associated with volume of trading. By
contrast, our model treats the clearinghouse as a club of its members, not a
separate agency. We ignore any ex ante conflicts of interest among members.
We assume that all members are clearing members. We also ignore the presence
of customers served by members in their broker capacity; the clearinghouse
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exists to provide local public goods to exchange membership, not to enforce a
brokerage cartel. 1
Margin setting with a single commodity
In the course of modelling the determinants of contract margin, we
demonstrate that margin setting and the formation of clearing houses are both
motivated by the need of market participants to balance deadweight losses due
to counterparty defaults against the opportunity cost of margin deposits.
Despite the fact that interest-bearing assets may be posted, we assume margin
requirements have a positive opportunity cost because a firm's marginal
borrowing cost exceeds the return on its marginable assets. In the simplest
case, the marginal opportunity cost of a margin deposit is assumed to be a
constant which we call i. We later generalize this to the case where the
opportunity cost is an increasing function of the amount of margin demanded.
We first model the setting of margin in a bilateral marketplace. There
are two parties j and h. Assume that in the event of default, participants
are only able to attach collateral that has previously been posted. 2 There
are two periods. In the opening period, the two parties trade with each
other; one party buys the contracts from the other party. We do not model the
motivation for trading; it is exogenous to this model. Let N(j ,h) denote the
"Violations of these assumptions can lead to economically important and
interesting complications of our model. For instance, when some members act as
brokers for non-member traders and some do not, members will disagree about
regulations governing dual trading (see Sarkar, 1993).
2In practice, clearinghouses may have additional collateral on clearing
members: required deposits in an exchange guarantee fund, required purchases of
minimum numbers of exchange memberships, etc. In addition, clearinghouses
require that clearing firms maintain a certain minimum level of capital. The
system of requiring the actual posting of margin may imply two things: 1)
attaching additional collateral is very costly; or 2) counterparties cannot
verify the existence of other liabilities or assets. In either case, this
additional collateral can be ignored.
number of contracts outstanding between j and h. If N(j ,h) is positive, j is
long the contract. If N(j,h) is negative, then j is short the contract so
that N(j ,h) = -N(h,j)
.
In the second period, the contract is settled based on a random final
price for the underlying good. The final price is assumed to be symmetrically
distributed with a finite variance such that the change in the value of the
contract, x, is a random variable with mean zero and standard deviation s.
We assume that the two parties set the margin posted by j with h,
m(j ,h) , and the margin posted by h with j, m(h,j). Initial and maintenance
margins are assumed to be identical. Margin payments are made in cash and
placed into an interest-bearing account. The interest paid on the account is
paid to the party posting the margin. At the end of period 2, the contract is
settled. If x is positive and less than m(h,j), x is transferred from the
short's account to the long's account. Thus the short now has m(h,j)-x; the
long now has m(j ,h) + x. If x is negative and |x| is less than m(j ,h) then x
is transferred from the long to the short.
Traders are assumed to immediately bring their margin-account balances
back to m(j ,h) and m(h,j) by making new cash deposits when they are on the
losing side and by withdrawing any excess balances. Because recoveries in the
event of a default are limited to the margin account balance and participants
do not carry any excess balances, we preclude the possibility that traders who
have previously realized gains are better able to weather adverse price
movements. This means that a simple two-period futures contract resembles in
important respects an n-period contract which is marked to market at the close
of each period.
By entering into a contract, the counterparties implicitly give each
other an option to default (see Figlewski, 1984). When will a default occur?
In the simplest case, a trader would default whenever his losses exceed the
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balance in his margin account. Thus, if x is positive and greater than
m(h,j), the short rationally defaults on the contract and takes possession of
the margin assets m(h,j). Similarly, if x is negative and |x| is greater than
m(j ,h) , the long rationally defaults and the short takes possession of the
margin assets m(j ,h) . We assume that default imposes a deadweight loss on the
counterparty that is a constant proportion, denoted a, of the amount of the
difference between the promised payment and the actual payment. These
deadweight losses include the cost of recontracting, higher borrowing costs
which arise from liquidity problems, and costs arising from financial
distress. The expected deadweight loss from default born by agent j is:
00
D(j,h)= aN f (x- m(j ,h))f(x,s)dx C 1 )
i(J\h)
where N is the net number of contracts j has open with h.
We assume that the parties to the contract will seek to jointly minimize
the costs of contracting. We make this assumption because traders have a wide
choice of partners when first opening a trade, a situation which approximates
perfect competition; it is only after the initial contract has been made that
a bargaining problem arises between the two parties. Contracting entails
three costs: the opportunity cost of margin deposits I(j,h), the credit risk
(the expected difference between the promised payment and the actual payment)
L(j ,h) , and the expected deadweight losses incurred in the event of default
D(j ,h) . Offsetting these costs, each party also receives an option to default
0(j ,h) . The two parties seek to minimize these costs; that is, they minimize:
I(j,h)+ I(h,j) Opportunity Costs
+ D(j ,h) + D(h,j) Deadweight Losses
+ L(j ,h) + L(h,j) Credit Risk
- 0(j ,h) - 0(H,j) Default Options
Because one party's default option is another party's credit risk, that is
L(j ,h) = -0(h,j), the expression for contracting costs reduces to
r(j,h)+ I(hJ)+ D(j,h)+ D(h,j) (2)
which is the sum of the interest costs and deadweight losses for h and j
.
Thus, substituting into (2) from (1) the total cost to be minimized is
N{i(m(j,h)+m(h,j))
(3)
«
-m(j,h)
+ q[ (x-m(j ,h))f(x,s)dx + (m( j ,h)- x)f (x, s)dx] )
m(.r,h) -"to
Minimizing (3) with respect to m(j ,h) and m(h,j) yields the following
first order conditions:
1- F(m(j,h),s)= i
a
F(-m(h,j),s) = 1
a
Thus margins are optimal when the probability of default is equated to the
ratio of opportunity cost of an additional dollar of margin to the deadweight
loss rate. The higher this ratio, the lower the optimal level of margin.
Note that the objective function is linear in the number of contracts. Hence,
in the case of constant marginal opportunity cost, the level of margin per
unit of exposure is independent of the aggregate level of exposure. In other
words, there are constant returns to scale in risk management. If the
distribution of price changes is symmetric, margins will be equal on long and
short positions. Finally, note that when prices are normally distributed, a
mean preserving spread in x causes the margin to increase proportionately with
s. We define the coverage ratio as:
COV= E (4)
The first-order conditions above imply that when the opportunity cost of
margin assets is constant, the coverage ratio should not vary with volatility.
A similar result is derived in Fenn and Kupiec (1993) and Craine (1992).
Clearinghouses offer market participants the possibility of reducing
both deadweight default costs and the opportunity costs created by holding
assets in margin accounts, even in the absence of other externalities such as
failure of the payments system or reputation. Absent these other
externalities, the previous results ensure that, per contract, margin will be
the same whether contracts are cleared and settled bilaterally by pairs of
counterparties or multilaterally through a clearing house. Because a
clearinghouse will set the same margin rate that our representative agents
willingly negotiate between themselves, it becomes relatively straightforward
to analyze the benefits derived from forming a clearinghouse. In our model,
the key benefit of the clearinghouse is that it permits its members to
economize on margin while at the same time reducing their expected deadweight
losses. Clearinghouses economize on margins and deadweight loss because, for
the same set of contracts, each participant's net exposure is smaller. As a
result, the total amount of margin posted at the clearinghouse is smaller
than the total amount posted in a world of bilateral transactions and the
expected deadweight loss to each party is smaller.
Under a bilateral system j posts margin of m|N(j,h)| with each of n
counterparties. Summing over all of j ' s counterparties, j posts total margin
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of mjT \N(j,h)\ . Summing over all participants j, total margin posted by
n
all participants is m$^52 I^O'»^)l •
J n
Under a clearinghouse system, j must post margin only against the net of
his position with the rest of the market which is ra l2_,N(j,h)| . In effect,
n
the clearinghouse gives participants a vehicle for securing a potential
defaulter's long losing positions with one counterparty with a potential
defaulter's winning positions from another counterparty. Summing over all
parties j, the total margin posted on all contracts is m2_, C^O'»^)l
J n
Since 5T5T l w O'>^)l ^X) lzJ^O"k)l total margin and total opportunity cost
j n J n
will never be greater under a clearinghouse framework and will generally be
smaller
.
Similarly, no counterparty's expected deadweight loss is greater under a
clearinghouse system and some will be smaller. In a bilateral system, j's
expected loss from counterparty default is proportional to the number of open
contracts; that is, z2 I^O>^)l In a multilateral clearinghouse, j's
n
expected loss from defaults is proportional to the net number of open
contracts; that is, l£N(j,h)|
,
Because the creation of a clearinghouse leaves no participant worse off
and lowers margin requirements and deadweight default costs for some
participants, then the creation of a clearinghouse is pareto optimal. In our
model, these improvements are achieved because the clearinghouse is able to
register trades and make the proceeds from a party's winning positions
available to offset losing positions.
Increasing opportunity cost of funds
The cost of funds function may be increasing in the amount of margin
required. Many results in corporate finance suggest that interest costs
increase with the level of total borrowing. In the one-contract case, an
increase in margins would thus drive up the marginal cost of funds. Thus, if
marginal costs of margin are increasing in m:
c=c (m) ; c'(/n)>0 ( 5)
Note that, even if their cost functions are identical, individuals who
hold different numbers of contracts will have different marginal costs of
funds. In addition, the slope and level of the cost functions may differ
across individuals. This will result in disagreement among members as to
appropriate margin levels, though each will have only one preferred margin
level. Under majority rule, if individuals have single-peaked preferences,
the club goods literature shows that an equilibrium will be reached which
reflects median voter preferences. 3 In this case, the marginal cost involved
in equation (6) is that of the median voting member.
The clearinghouse sets:
3Exchanges usually set margins, not on the basis of a direct vote, but by
a committee designed to be representative of the membership. It should also be
noted that some firms, having more than one seat, have more than one vote.
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aA mean-preserving spread now causes the clearinghouse to increase the
margin less than proportionately with s. As the standard deviation increases,
the clearinghouse would increase the margin level to keep the probability of
default constant. However, this drives up the marginal financing costs of its
members. The members of the clearinghouse therefore choose to bear greater
deadweight losses in order to economize on their financing costs. Thus,
coverage ratios should decrease with volatility.
In equilibrium, clearinghouses will set margin levels such that the
opportunity cost is strictly positive, since additional margin increases
coverage ratios. Empirically, marginal opportunity costs are not directly
observable. However, the model does still have empirical implications
provided suitable proxies for shifts in the marginal opportunity cost are
available
.
If the participants in some markets tend to have higher financing costs
than others, clientele effects might observed. If coverage ratios are
systematically higher for financial than for the agricultural futures, this
might reflect the lower financing costs of financial firms. In addition,
markets with smaller firm participants are likely to have steeper opportunity
cost of funds functions. If marginal interest costs increase with borrowing
levels, then coverage ratios will decrease less as volatility increases for
contracts that are a smaller part of the total portfolio.
Margin setting on a multi-contract exchange
In generalizing the model to a multi-contract exchange, the
clearinghouse can set margin on a per-contract basis because losses are
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linearly related to the size of the position. We assume that the
clearinghouse knows each trader's position at all times. Since all positions
are cleared through the clearinghouse, this assumption is reasonable. We also
assume that the clearinghouse has complete control of a trader's margin; if
the member has a gain on one leg of a spread and a loss on the other, the
clearinghouse can use the gain to help offset the loss . Thus , all that
concerns the clearinghouse is the total loss and the total margin.
The traders each deposit margin m with the clearinghouse, where the
clearinghouse specifies the function m = m(n
x
,n2 , . . .nq ) ,
where q contracts are
listed on the clearinghouse. The function m(
.
,
.
) is determined endogenously
by the clearinghouse. At the end of period one, the position is marked to
market. The changes in the value of the contracts, x
x ,
x 2 , . . . are assumed to
be jointly normally distributed, with means zero, and covariance matrix S =
{ Si>j }.
The net gains or losses of a trader are:
i^i
If g is positive, the clearinghouse transfers g to the trader's account
from the clearinghouse account. If g is negative and less than m, the
clearinghouse transfers g from the trader's account to the clearinghouse
account. In either case, the trader then has g + m. Since contracts sold
equal contracts bought, and the gain to the short equals the loss to the long
on each contract, the clearinghouse's account will net out at zero, except for
contract defaults. Traders are assumed to bring their margin account balances
back to m immediately. As above, initial and maintenance margins are assumed
to be identical and excess balances are assumed to be withdrawn.
If g is negative and greater than m, the trader is assumed to default on
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the contract. The clearinghouse transfers m from the trader's account to the
clearinghouse account and adds (g-m) from its own funds. The trader's
position is automatically closed out at the settlement price (as above, with
no additional loss to the clearinghouse). The clearinghouse loses one-for-one
as g exceeds m.
Since linear combinations of normal variables are themselves normal, g
is distributed normally with mean zero and variance given by:
Varig)
-J) f) nd n. Sij (8)
The clearinghouse's expected loss is still:
f(g-m)f(g,o)dg ( 9 )
Therefore, the clearinghouse sets:
£LiEL
- 4-) {g-m) tig) dg < 10 >
or
:
^M = l-F(m) dD
ft
Note that, since we are now relating the loss on a portfolio of
contracts to a sum of margin deposits, results should resemble standard CAPM
formulations, i.e., the contribution of a contract to portfolio variance
should be related to its covariance with the rest of the portfolio. However,
it is not reasonable to assume that diversification is complete, since most
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members will not be holding a large number of different futures contracts.
Since the expected value of the portfolio is always zero at settlement, the
main difference that multiple contracts makes is to redefine the coverage
ratio to be:
m
~dF (12)
dni
There are two immediate implications of this formula. First, a
clearinghouse setting a margin requirement for a single-contract position
would set the same margin as a single-contract clearinghouse, given the same
opportunity cost of margin. Second, due to the diversification effects of
imperfectly covarying contract prices, the margin requirement for a multi-
contract position will generally be less than the sum of the margins for the
individual single-contract positions. Both of these implications are
qualitatively supported by what we know about current and past exchange
margin-setting policies. The first of these implications is explicitly tested
in our empirical work.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
A number of researchers have analyzed margin setting. In Telser (1981)
margin must be adequate to cover expected broker losses from defaults, but is
driven down to an equilibrium level by competition among brokers. Exchanges
may impose a minimum margin above this level due to the reputational
externalities of a contract default/ Figlewski (1984) calculates the
percentage of price moves which would be covered by the margin deposit, and
^Telser also demonstrates how commission restraints might be avoided through
adjustments to required margin.
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concludes that the protection provided by margin deposits is actually quite
good. 5 Hunter (1986) derives the optimal margin as a function of the risk
aversion of the members; he argues that optimal clearinghouse minimums should
be set as a function of the weighted average of the risk aversions of members.
A model similar to Figlewski's is provided in Gay, Hunter, and Kolb
(1986) . They argue that the probability of non-coverage for a given time
until settlement should be equal across contracts which are closely related
economically, and across time for any one commodity. This hypothesis is
tested by comparing non-coverage probabilities across contracts. They
conclude that non-coverage probabilities differ across commodities. However,
individual commodities seem to have constant probabilities across time. They
also find that revisions in margin levels are made in a direction consistent
with their model. One possible interpretation of their empirical results is
that revising margin requirements is a costly process, done only
intermittently, or that the cost of an inappropriate margin level is
negligible
.
Craine (1992) models the clearinghouse as a profit-maximizing entity and
explicitly characterizes the option to default. He contends that, since the
clearinghouse does not explicitly charge a default premium to either long or
short, it must keep the value of this premium at or close to zero. Our
model, by contrast, implies that the value of the default premium equals the
credit risk for the representative agent. Fenn and Kupiec (1993) also assume
that the clearinghouse is profit-maximizing. In contrast, we model the
5Warshawsky (1989) analyses equity futures, cash, and options margin
systems, using a more robust procedure to assess the adequacy of futures,
options, and stock margining systems. Kofman (1992) finds that the probability
of default calculated in previous work significantly understates the true
probabilities. His empirical work suggests that the distributions of futures
prices are leptokurtic.
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clearinghouse as a joint agent of exchange members. In our formulation, the
clearinghouse does not have to make a profit: members would be willing to
subsidize the clearinghouse to avoid the greater cost of a bilateral
arrangement. In neither Craine's nor Fenn and Kupiec's model is there an
explicit economic rationale for the existence of the clearinghouse.
The main contribution of Fenn and Kupiec is to explain the role of
frequency of settlement in setting margin size. They model cases where the
clearinghouse sets the frequency of regular settlements, and where it calls
for special settlement whenever necessary. The clearinghouse minimizes total
costs, where costs involve margin costs, settlement costs, and the cost of
allowing a deficit to arise in a clearinghouse's account. The clearinghouse
sets the probability of a deficit equal to the ratio of opportunity costs per
settlement period to the marginal cost of an account deficit. As in our
constant interest-cost model, the ratio of margin to volatility should be
constant for given opportunity costs and settlement frequency; as volatility
increases, however, more frequent settlement may be cost-minimizing, and the
margin-to-volatility ratio may decline. In practice, changes in settlement
frequency are not very common. Most clearinghouses settle once a day; some
have instituted twice-daily settlements between clearing members. Only in
extremely rare circumstances do clearinghouses call for special settlement;
when they do, it is normally in addition to regular settlement.
The contribution of our model is to give an expression for the optimal
value of the default option. As such, it is closely related to Gay, Hunter
and Kolb , and especially to Fenn and Kupiec. With the exception of the model
of this paper, only Fenn and Kupiec take explicit account of the opportunity
cost of margin, though it is implicit in some of the earlier work.
The theoretical work cited above implies that higher anticipated
volatility should lead to higher margin requirements. Another strand of
16
literature, however, argues that higher margin requirements will supress
excess speculation, leading to lower volatility in the future. Since
volatility is a persistent series, it is hard to distinguish empirically
between these two effects in a single time series. 6
IV. Tests of the model
A. Data
Margin data were obtained from the clearing organizations for eighteen
contracts trading on the following futures exchanges: the Chicago Board of
Trade, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange,
the Commodity Exchange, and the New York Mercantile Exchange. The eighteen
contracts selected are the most heavily traded contracts having options on the
underlying futures contract.
With the exception of the New York Mercantile Exchange, margin
requirements are differentially assessed based on affiliation with the
exchange. The speculative positions of nonclearing members are assessed the
highest levels of margin. 7 The initial margin requirement for clearing
members is generally the same as the initial margin amount for the hedge
positions of nonclearing members. Finally, the maintenance margin
6Recent attempts include Fishe , Goldberg, Gosnell, and Sinha (1990), Hsieh
and Miller (1991), Kupiec (1990), and Moser (1991, 1992, 1993). Surveys of
earlier contributions may be found in Chance (1990), France (1991), and France,
Kodres , Kupiec, and Moser (1992). Approaches vary; several of these studies use
GARCH or ARIMA models based on the historical time series of volatility to remove
the persistence in the series. Only one other study of which we are aware uses
implied standard deviations to estimate volatility. Day and Lewis (1992) use a
technique similar to ours to study the relationship of volatility and margin
levels in the oil futures market.
7Margin amounts collected when these accounts are opened are referred to as
initial margin. Should the amount of margin fall below a specified maintenance
level, the margin balance must be restored to the current initial level.
Maintenance margin requirements in US stock markets differ. In stock markets,
should a deficiency occur, margin must be restored to the maintenance level.
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requirements of clearing members are the same as their initial requirements.
Thus, our assumption that accounts are brought back to m after each settlement
period gives a lower bound for the amount of margin in a clearing member's
account: they must always have at least the amount of the current initial
margin, and may choose to allow excess balances to remain in the account.
Table 1 provides summary information on these contracts. Listed under
each exchange are the contracts trading on that exchange which were used in
the analysis. The start date is the first date used in the sample; generally,
this date is determined by the beginning of options trading on the respective
futures contracts. In each case, the sample extends through June 1991.
Sample dates are the last Thursday of every contract month. The number of
available observations ranges from 29 for the Treasury Bond and Deutschemark
contracts to 15 for the Heating Oil contract. Mean margin levels reported are
for initial positions classified as nonmember speculative and for clearing
members (or nonmember hedgers) on the above- indicated sample dates.
For each of the sample dates, data were collected to impute volatilities
for the respective contracts. These data are: prices for call options
expiring in the next delivery month at each strike price traded on that date,
futures settlement prices for corresponding delivery months, and Treasury bill
rates with maturities most closely matching the time until expiration of the
option contracts. These data were obtained from the Wall Street Journal. The
Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) model was used to impute volatilities for each
of the option contracts. A time series of representative implied standard
deviations (ISDs) for each contract was calculated on each sample date using a
Taylor-series approximation based on iterated regressions as described by
whaley (1982). The method employs a nonlinear regression to obtain a
representative ISD incorporating the information available from each of the
options traded. Mean ISDs are reported. These range from a low of .01 for
18
the Eurodollar contract to .53 for the Sugar contract. 8
Margin coverage ratios divide the respective margin amounts by dollar-
price volatility. To obtain dollar-price volatility, ISDs are multiplied by
the dollar value of the contract- - futures prices times number of deliverable
units- -and divided by the square root of 365. This gives a market-based
estimate of dollar volatility for one day. Initial speculative and member
margin requirements are divided by the dollar volatilities previously
described. Means of these coverage ratios are reported in Table 1. Margin
coverage ratios appear to be grouped according to their classification as
member or nonmember. Nonmember speculative margin coverages seem to be
roughly distributed around five. Comparison of nonmember speculative and
member margin requirements indicates that clearing member margins are about
80% of the level required for speculative positions. The exception is the New
York Mercantile Exchange where they are equal
.
Notably, the coverage ratio for the S&P 500 contract is well above the
typical level obtained for nonmember speculative positions, averaging 10.17
during the sample period. Member margin coverages are generally around four.
In this case, the S&P 500 margin does not fall outside the range obtained for
other contracts. The discrepancy between these coverage ratios suggests that
determination of nonmember speculative margins for the S&P contract may have
reflected additional requirements during the sample period.
This contrast becomes even more extreme when allowance is made for the
length of the settlement period. During part of this period, the S&P 500
contract settled twice per day. Other contracts settled only once per day
throughout the period. Since the daily standard deviation is used in
8Implied standard deviations for short-term interest rate contracts are
generally expressed in terms of yield variation. For consistency with our other
contracts, they are here reported in terms of variation of rates of return.
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calculating the coverage ratio, one would expect the coverage ratio to be
smaller, not larger, for the S&P 500, other things equal (see Fenn and Kupiec,
1993).
Assuming price changes are normally distributed, this coverage ratio for
clearing members implies that the probability of a price change exceeding
required margin from one settlement period to the next is much less than 1%.
Thus, exchanges seem to set margin such that the probability of losses
exceeding margin levels is extremely small. A subsequent subsection examines
the relationship between coverage ratios and our proxies for the opportunity
cost of placing margin deposits.
B . Examination of individual cross-sections
The arguments of Figlewski (1984) and others state that margin levels
should rise as volatility in the underlying contract rises. To examine this
hypothesis, regressions were run for contract cross sections at each of the
thirty sample dates. Dependent variables in these regressions were the
initial margin levels for the open futures positions of members and
nonmembers . These were regressed on the dollar volatilities imputed from the
corresponding futures options. The specification is:
MARGIN± = « + a 1 DOLVOL i + c i for each contract i (13)
Results for speculative margin levels are reported in Table 2a and for
member margin levels in Table 2b. Results are very similar regardless of
margin classifications. These results are in the main consistent with the
hypothesis that price volatility is an important determinant of exchange
margin policy. Coefficients are positive as predicted and generally differ
reliably from zero. Two exceptions are apparent in Table 2a. The first is
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for the sample date of 6/84 where the number of observations is smallest- -3.
The second is 12/88 which is positive but insignificant. In Table 2b, the
12/88 coefficient differs reliably from zero. The discrepancy between the
12/88 results in Table 2a and 2b is consistent with exchanges adjusting member
margins more rapidly than nonmember margins. The R2 figures obtained from
these regressions add support for the conclusion that margins are set in
accord with price volatility- -considerable portions of the cross -sectional
variations are explained by price volatility.
C . Time-series Evidence
To obtain further insight into the margin-setting process, daily data
were obtained for four of the eighteen contracts. These contracts are:
Deutschemark, S&P 500, Soybean and Treasury Bond. Implied volatilities were
computed using the procedures previously described. These were matched with
required margin levels on these dates and margin coverage ratios were
computed. The time series of these quantities were examined.
The first test considers whether coverage ratios for a contract tend to
revert to its long-run, unconditional mean. Denoting coverage ratios C0V t ,
our model implies that shocks to these ratios result in pressures to bring
them back to acceptable levels. Such a test does depend on the time path of
volatility. Substantial research finds evidence that the volatility of
returns on financial assets is nonstationary
.
9 Thus, adjustments to coverage
ratios are appropriately ascribed to changes in margin as opposed to mean
reversion in volatility: prudential concerns that coverage ratios have become
too small lead to increased margin coverage and the cost concerns inherent in
excessively large ratios lead to reduced margin coverage. Our model implies
9For an extensive review of this literature see Bollerslev, Chou, Jayaraman,
and Kroner (1992) .
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that in the absence of either of these pressures, coverage ratios would not be
adjusted to equilibrium levels, resulting in a non- stationary time series of
coverage ratios (our alternative hypothesis) . Evidence of stationarity is
consistent with our model.
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) procedure is employed to consider this
hypothesis. Changes in coverage ratios are regressed on the first lag of
their levels and lags of changes in the coverage ratio. The specification is:
Acov., t = « i/0 + ai#1COTi.M + I>i-i*;Acwi.t-; + ui.t (14)
The number of lags--K--is determined by comparing Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC) at various lag lengths, choosing the lag length which obtains
maximum AIC values.
The test examines the coefficient on the lag level. This test employs
the critical values provided by Fuller (1976): -1.95 at the 5% level and -2.58
at the 1% level. Coefficient t statistics below these critical values are
indicative of mean reversion in the series. In each case, evidence of mean
reversion is found at the 1% level or better regardless of the margin
category.
This test is then extended to determine if reversion to the mean is more
rapid when coverage ratios are above or below their long-run averages. The
prudential hypothesis of the previous authors such as Gay, Hunter, and Kolb
predicts that exchanges will respond to low coverage ratios by raising margin
requirements, but prudentiality does not explain how exchanges will respond to
shocks which result in high coverage ratios. In contrast, the model of this
paper predicts that the cost of margin coverage will induce exchanges to lower
margin coverage provided their prudentiality objectives are met. The ADF test
is modified to test for differential slopes on the lagged level of the
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coverage ratio. Quartiles are determined for the sample of coverage ratios
and dummy variables, denoted Q 1 , computed to classify observations according
to these quartiles. Lagged coverage ratios are multiplied by these dummy
variables to obtain a specification which can capture differential responses
by the exchanges based on levels of lagged coverage ratios. This
specification is:
K
I
1-1 i-1
ACOVt = « + £ afoJO0VM + J^a^COV,.. * u t (15)
Coefficients generally differ reliably from zero. The exception is the
speculative margin requirement of the Soybean contract where response to low
coverage ratios has the correct sign, but is not significant. However, in
every case coefficients on the highest quartile classification differ reliably
from zero. This is consistent with an exchange policy to lower margin
requirements when margin coverages exceed their long-run averages. This
result implies an internalization of the costs of high margins born by the
exchange membership. The internalization of these costs, although generally
implicit in the literature, is explicitly predicted only by Fenn and Kupiec
(1993) and the model in this paper.
Further evidence of the tradeoff between prudentiality and margin costs
can be obtained from a comparison of the coefficients on the low and high
coverage quartiles. Coefficients which are larger (in absolute value) imply
quicker responses to shocks to the coverage ratio. In every case, the
coefficients on the low-coverage quartiles are larger in absolute value than
those on the high-coverage quartiles. This implies that these exchanges
respond more quickly to surety lost when coverage ratios decline than to the
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increase in costs borne by exchange members when coverage ratios rise 10
D. Pooled cross -section time series analysis
Our theoretical analysis suggests that margin setting by clearinghouses
is influenced by the opportunity costs incurred by posting margin assets. In
addition, with increasing costs, the higher the volatility, the lower the
coverage ratio.
The opportunity cost of margin is the difference between the cost of
financing an additional dollar of margin assets and the return on those
assets. If participants were required to post margin in the form of non-
interest-bearing cash, movements in firms' short-term borrowing costs would
provide a good proxy for the impact of money-market conditions on changes in
the opportunity cost of margin. However, most margin deposits are in the form
of securities or standby letters of credit rather than cash.
In the case of securities, the appropriate measure of opportunity cost
is the difference between the yield on the margin assets and an additional
dollar of credit with a comparable duration. During the period covered in
this paper, the five clearinghouses included in our sample accepted government
and agency-debt securities as margin; Treasury bills being the most widely
posted form of margin. 11
Ideally, we would like to have a time series on the spread between the
risk-adjusted borrowing costs of market participants and rates on Treasury
bills. However, such a series is unavailable. This forces us to proxy for
10 An F test indicates that the difference between the coefficients on the
high and low quartiles of the S&P and Deutschemark contracts is significant at
better than the 95% level.
11 Other clearinghouses, for instance the Options Clearing Corporation, have
long accepted equity as margin. This practice is increasingly being adopted by
other clearinghouses.
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the cost of borrowing. The borrowing costs of market participants could vary
over time because of economy-wide shifts in the cost of borrowing. However,
if individual borrowers face upward- sloping supply curves for credit,
borrowing costs for market participants could also vary over time because of
changes in the credit demands of market participants.
Commercial banks are a significant source of credit to futures market
participants. As a result, the prime rate is a useful indicator of economy-
wide shifts in the cost of credit obtained through the banking system.
Indeed, the majority of floating-rate loans made to commercial borrowers are
tied to the prime rate. 12 When the prime rate rises, firms with prime -based
loan agreements experience a change in borrowing costs irrespective of changes
in open market rates. Differences between the prime rate and the Treasury
bill rate provide one indicator of changes in the opportunity cost of
margin. 13
Proxies for shifts in the market participant ' s borrowing costs
If the borrower does not face a perfectly elastic supply of external
financing, borrowing costs also vary over time and across borrowers as the
quantity borrowed increases. The assumption that borrowers do not face a
perfectly elastic supply of external financing is supported by a growing body
of literature which indicates that firms --both financial and
12 For example, see the Terms of Lending at Commercial Banks Survey for
November 2-6, 1992 published in the February 1993 Federal Reserve Bulletin.
13 It is less obvious that the opportunity costs associated with obtaining
standby letters of credit (SLOC) should vary with monetary policy since they
create no funding obligation for the bank. However, clearinghouses generally
limit the SLOC portion of total margin posted. In the case of the Board of Trade
Clearing Corporation, the SLOC share of margin deposits cannot exceed 25 percent
of a member's adjusted net capital. In the case of the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange Clearinghouse, clearing members with margin requirements in excess of
$5 million, standbys can be no more than 50 percent of margin requirements in
excess of $5 million.
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nonfinancial- - find it costly to raise additional debt or equity from external
sources . 14
If clearinghouse members do not face a perfectly elastic supply of
external finance, we would expect to observe a negative correlation between
coverage ratios and volatility levels. Holding the coverage ratio, open
interest, and the clearing member's other assets constant, an increase in
volatility implies higher margin deposits and greater external financing.
With an upward- sloping supply of external funds, this higher margin
requirement will result in higher borrowing costs and a higher opportunity
cost for deposited margin. An optimizing clearinghouse will respond to this
higher opportunity cost by reducing its coverage ratios. Thus, we would
expect that, holding constant economy-wide borrowing costs, volatility and
borrowing cost will be positively correlated while volatility and the coverage
ratio would be negatively correlated.
The specification
The foregoing discussion suggests the following specification:
C0Vit " *i0 + «l*t + *i2ISDit + V-it (16)
where i denotes the ith contract, Rt is a proxy variable designed to capture
intertemporal variation in the opportunity cost of borrowing that are the
result of economy-wide changes in the cost of borrowing from the banking
system, and ISD it is the implied standard deviation for the particular
contract. These implied standard deviations are included to capture
14 Calomiris and Hubbard (1992), Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1987);
Himmelberg and Petersen (1989); Fazzari and Petersen (1990); Hubbard and Kashyap
(1992) all provide evidence that nonfinancial firms behave as if they find it
extremely expensive to finance growth through external financing. Baer and
McElravey (1993) report similar results for U.S. banking corporations.
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intertemporal and cross -sectional differences in market participants'
opportunity cost that are the result of differences in the demand for credit
to finance margin positions. Our model offers the following restrictions:
« jo >0, ajiO, « i2 s0
We estimate equation (16) by pooling data on 18 contracts for the time
periods reported in Table 1. Table 4 presents the pooled estimation results
for equation (16) using both the prime rate (RPR) and the spread between the
prime rate and the Treasury bill rate (SPREAD) as the measures of changes in
the opportunity cost of margin. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 present the
results for a pooled regression where the coefficients on ISD are constrained
to be the same across contracts. 15 In both cases the coefficient on ISD is
negative and reliably different from zero. The coefficient on RPR is negative
but insignificant while the coefficient on SPREAD is negative and significant
at the 5% level. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 present estimates of equation
(16) where we constrain the coefficients a i0 and a i2 to be constant across time
periods but permit them to vary across commodities. We find that the
coefficients on RPR and SPREAD are significantly less than zero at the 5
percent level. In both specifications, we also find that the coefficients on
implied volatility are negative for all contracts and significantly less than
zero in 12 of 18 contracts. In addition, an F test rejects the joint
hypothesis that all coefficients on ISD equal zero; that is, consistent with
our model we reject a
x 2 =• • • = <*i 2
=
• • •
= a i8 2
= at t^ie -0001 level.
Contracts for which the implied standard deviation has no explanatory
15Note that our model does not require that the coefficients on ISD be equal
across contracts. Indeed, if different individuals hold different numbers of
contracts, the opportunity cost of a per-contract increase in margin would differ
among members, and therefore might differ across contracts. All our model
requires is that this coefficient be negative.
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power include the British Pound, cattle, copper, gold, silver, and Treasury
bonds . The heavy volume of the Treasury bond contract makes this exception
especially interesting. Notably, margin requirements for the participants in
this market are likely to be least onerous since their ordinary course of
business makes available to them a ready supply of marginable assets. It is
interesting to note that margin requirements for three of the remaining
exceptions are determined by a single organization, COMEX.
Consideration of Alternative Specifications
There is the possibility that estimating equation (16) may yield a
negative correlation between volatility and the coverage ratio even if our
model were incorrect. Suppose that instead of being set on a cost-minimizing
basis, clearinghouses set margin at fixed percentages of current prices for
futures contracts, that is
where ? L t is the price of the ith futures contract at time t. If we divide
both sides of equation (17) by DOLVOLi t , then
COVit =
PliPit
= -^_ (18)2 DOLVOLit ISDit
In this case we would find that ISD and the coverage ratio would be negatively
correlated even though (17) is the true model. However, this alternative
model implies that coefficients on our proxies for the opportunity cost of
margin, a
x
should be zero. Thus, our estimates of equation (16) reject this
alternative in favor of our model.
Another possibility is that exchanges set margin at constant levels
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independent of either price or volatility, that is
In this instance, the coverage ratio becomes
covit =
^oi (20)
DOLVOLit
The positive correlation of DOLVOL and ISD thereby implies a negative
correlation between ISD and our coverage ratio even though, in this instance,
equation (19) is the true model. This possibility is not strictly nested
within the specification given in equation (16) , requiring an alternative
procedure. We estimate a specification based on (20), obtaining predicted
values for coverage ratios. We augment equation (16) by including these
predicted values and re-estimate. Under the alternative null the coefficients
on our implied standard deviations and opportunity-cost proxies should be
zero. The F statistic for these coefficients jointly equaling zero is 8.6.
This result strongly favors our model over the alternative.
V. Summary
Our model recognizes that determination of margin requirements is driven
by the cost of external funds and the deadweight losses associated with
counterparty default. The opportunity cost of posting margins both creates
the need for a clearing house and governs the setting of margins. As a
voluntary association, the exchange internalizes these costs into its margin
decisions. Thus, exchange pursuit of prudentiality through margin is
constrained by the costs that members incur by carrying these balances.
Our examination of the cross-section evidence confirms the results of
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previous research indicating that exchange determination of margin
incorporates prudential concerns. The time series of coverage ratios also
supports this conclusion, but suggests that exchanges respond to high levels
of margin by adjusting coverage ratios downward. This behavior cannot be
explained by prudentiality alone.
Our pooled-regression results indicate that futures exchanges set margin
in a cost-minimizing fashion, balancing the risk of loss against the greater
opportunity costs associated with higher margins. Our results suggest that at
least a portion of these opportunity costs arise because market participants
have imperfect access to capital markets for their general financing. This is
in contrast to the emphasis of Fenn and Kupiec (1993) on the transactions
costs of frequent mark-to-market settlements.
Researchers have long argued whether margin requirements have
significant impacts on market participation. However, efforts to demonstrate
the significance of opportunity costs by studying the impact of margin changes
on volume and open interest have met with little success, perhaps because the
null hypotheses is so poorly posed. By developing a model of clearinghouse
behavior we are able to generate testable hypotheses about margin setting.
The data are consistent with the hypothesis that opportunity cost is
important. Having established how and why opportunity costs affect margin
setting, it may now be easier to establish how and why they affect volume and
open interest.
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Table 1
Margins and implied volatilities
Contract Sample N Mean Mean Initial Mean Mean Initial Mean
Start ISD Speculative Speculative Member Member
Date Margin Coverage Margin Coverage
Chicago Board of Trade
Corn 3/85 26 .21 520.58 5.10 353.85 3.38
Soybeans 12/84 26 .16 1396.38 5.61 1067.31 4.20
Treasury Bond 3/84 29 .11 2618.97 5.32 2120.69 4.27
Wheat 3/87 16 .21 725.31 4.38 543.75 3.24
Chicago Mercantile Exch;anse
British Pound 3/85 26 .12 2197.23 5.44 1938.46 5.02
Deutschemark 3/84 29 .12 1864.17 5.45 1689.66 5.01
Eurodollar 3/85 17 .01 925.00 7.06 823.53 6.07
Japanese Yen 6/86 21 .10 2069.67 4.90 1788. 10 4.24
Live Cattle 12/84 23 .14 756.78 4.02 619.57 3.29
Swiss Franc 3/85 26 .12 2111.38 4.81 1875.00 4.25
S&P 500 3/84 26 .17 11134.62 10. 17 4865.38 4.56
Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Excharige
Coffee 12/87 15 .30 2733.33 5.25 1366.67 2.62
Sugar 3/85 26 .53 1209.62 5.46 604.81 2.73
Commodi ty Exchange
Copper 6/86 20 .30 1734.50 4.81 1355.00 3.66
Gold 3/84 28 .16 1692.46 5.34 1253.57 3.95
Silver 12/84 27 .24 2004.52 5.55 1585.00 4.10
New York Mercantile Exchange
Crude Oil 12/86 19 .36 2284.21 7.53 2284.21 7.53
Heating Oil 9/87 15 .37 2293.33 6.79 2293.33 6.79
Note: Start date is the first sample date. Mean margin is the average of initial speculative or initial member margin
required on the sample dates. Mean ISD is the average implied standard deviation for options trading on the sample dates.
The Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) model is used to impute volatilities. The Whaley (1982) method is used to combine
volatilities at each sample date. Margin coverage is respective level of margin divided by the dollar volatility of the
contract. Dollar volatilities are ISD multiplied by the dollar value of the contract and divided by the square root of 365
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Table 2a
Cross-section regressions of initial speculative-margin on dollar volatility
MARGINt = « + a 1 DOLVOL t + e t
Date
3/84
6/84
9/84
12/84
3/85
6/85
9/85
12/85
3/86
6/86
9/86
12/86
3/87
6/87
9/87
12/87
3/88
6/88
9/88
12/88
3/89
6/89
9/89
12/89
3/90
6/90
9/90
12/90
3/91
6/91
a t(a )
4
3
4
7
11
12
11
12
12
13
13
14
14
13
17
16
18
18
18
16
18
17
18
14
16
18
18
16
18
16
-1886.4 -5.56
-1415.6 -0.25
-3461.2 -2.99
-47.6 -0.04
-820.2 -1.11
-733.0 -1.19
-560.6 -0.62
-416.0 -1.64
177.2 0.56
268.2 0.89
-75.7 -0.35
203.5 1.81
79.6 0.56
-275.1 -0.66
-162.4 -0.79
-636.0 -0.64
-1665.1 -0.94
424.1 0.35
-2271.5 -1.89
1673.1 1.11
-2034.4 -3.78
454.0 2.68
-169.8 -0.84
393.1 1.02
290.2 1.19
-886.6 -2.49
1601.2 1.29
1017.4 3.06
-2747.3 -3.16
295.0 1.34
"1
10.82
11.39
14.71
7.55
9.10
8.48
7.47
7.76
4.11
4.22
68
41
09
98
73
96
11.41
5.01
12.31
2.46
12.25
3.49
5.39
4.35
4.44
8.13
2.42
1.91
13.42
3.64
tCa^)
14.25
0.88
10.25
6.81
6.75
10.84
18.93
21.26
8.38
14.55
20
73
89
02
36
10.22
12.18
13.97
3.79
6
15.
2
4
7
6
62
81
33
68
84
01
R2
.44
.94
.53
.70
.68
.49
.91
.82
.81
.91
.97
.97
.86
.93
.56
.32
.34
.61
.12
.87
.91
.92
.55
.76
.94
.25
.61
.79
.72
volatility expressed in dollars implied by futures options trading on the sample date. Implied standard deviations are
computed using the Barone-Adesi and Whaley pricing procedure. The Whaley (1982) method is used to combine volatilities at
each sample date. Margin coverage is initial speculative margin divided by the dollar volatility of the contract. Dollar
volatilities are ISD multiplied by the dollar value of the contract and divided by the square root of 365.
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Table 2b
Cross-section regressions of initial member-margin on dollar volatility
MARGINt = « + V-LDOLVOLt + e,
Date
3/84
6/84
9/84
12/84
3/85
6/85
9/85
12/85
3/86
6/86
9/86
12/86
3/87
6/87
9/87
12/87
3/88
6/88
9/88
12/88
3/89
6/89
9/89
12/89
3/90
6/90
9/90
12/90
3/91
6/91
<*0 t(a ) <*1
4
3
4
7
11
12
11
12
12
13
13
14
14
13
17
16
18
18
18
16
18
17
18
13
15
17
18
16
17
15
-93.4 -0.23
433.3 0.27
-351.5 -5.29
577.3 1.22
-318.1 -1.07
-177.9 -0.71
-340.7 -1.08
252.4 1.03
558.1 1.94
417.1 2.29
293.2 1.53
573.4 2.61
585.8 3.13
498.0 1.49
468.9 2.67
-156.3 -0.24
-854.6 -0.95
1038.6 1.53
733.3 2.63
1205.0 4.51
332.6 1.65
593.9 3.32
486.8 2.87
261.7 0.64
476.9 1.64
359.1 1.94
1044.9 2.32
604.9 1.67
-861.8 -2.35
281.9 1.28
4.23
4.16
5.34
3.28
5.76
20
35
90
17
68
82
94
86
30
73
12
49
31
12
64
08
89
28
24
48
4.61
1.12
36.28
2.35
7.
6.
6
5.
3,
7
7
5
7
4
8
4
3
2
3
2
6
6
7
2
R2
2.68
1.50
2.00
6.10
2.53
30
95
01
35
96
07
40
26
57
98
14
51
55
40
72
00
87
26
09
69
3.17
10.29
4.07
4.58
8.64
4.21
.91
.56
.99
.53
.86
.83
.80
.74
.61
.82
.83
.70
.83
.69
.82
.59
.44
.26
.46
.22
.75
.73
.76
.40
.44
.88
.52
.62
.83
.58
Note: Margin^ is the initial amount of margin required for member positions of the sample contracts. DOLVOL^ is the
volatility expressed in dollars implied by futures options trading on the sample date. Implied standard deviations are
computed using the Barone-Adesi and Whaley pricing procedure. The Whaley (1982) method is used to combine volatilities
obtained for the contracts at each sample date. Margin coverage is initial speculative margin divided by the dollar
volatility of the contract. Dollar volatilities are ISD multiplied by the dollar value of the contract and divided by the
square root of 365.
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Table 3
Margin coverage adjustments
Acov
c
= <x
c
+ a lcovt .1 * £ « 1+iAcwt_i + «t
Contract
Deutschemark
S&P 500
Soybean
Treasury Bond
Initial Speculative Margin
-.008044 -A. 73
-.001950 -2.88
-.006525 -3.40
-.013175 -6.48
Initial Member Margin
a=i tCa^)
-.004579 -3.52
-.004704 -2.88
-.012160 -4.04
-.017178 -6.84
4 K
ACOV
c
= a
- 5>i0'CWc_i + £ a 4*iAC0^-i + u c
l-l i-i
Contract /Posit ion
Deutschemark
Initial Speculative
Initial Member
S&P 500
Initial Speculative
Initial Member
Soybean
Initial Speculative
Initial Member
Treasury Bond
Initial Speculative
Initial Member
Lowest Quartile
*1 t(a x )
-.0234 -4.20
-.0135 -3.18
-.0126 -3.34
-.0438 -4.47
-.0088 -0.85
-.0277 -2.12
-.0374 -6.74
-.0408 -5.96
Level of margin coverage at time t-1
Second Quartile Third Quartile
of]_ tCa^) a^ tCa^)
-.0200 -4.18 -.0190 -4.54
-.0084 -2.58 -.0097 -3.43
-.0099 -3.49 -.0062 -3.17
-.0417 -5.25 -.0239 -4.44
-.0125 -1.71 -.0092 -1.87
-.0265 -2.88 -.0200 -2.91
-.0333 -6.90 -.0305 -7.04
-.0389 -6.48 -.0356 -6.55
Highest Quartile
<*! t(a^)
.0167 -4.77
.0090 -3.78
.0060 -4.06
.0233 -5.35
-.0078 -2.18
-.0180 -3.49
-.0282
-.0321
7.48
-6.83
COV^ is the time-t ratio of initial speculative margin to the option-implied volatility stated in dollars. Qi is the
coverage quartile for margin coverage during the sample period. Critical values are from Fuller (1976): -1.95 at the 5%
level and -2.58 at the 1% level. Lower values of t are indicative of reversion to the mean; i.e., the null of no mean
reversion is rejected.
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Table 4
Pooled Time-Series Regressions
18 18
covit = a + « 1j? t + a 2ISDlt + T IjDj * £ 6Jt°*JSDfct + Va
tt Jc-1
Opportunity Cost Proxy:
Parameter Contract
<*0
Coefficient Restriction: <S^=0
<*7
5fl
British Pound
Cattle
Coffee
Copper
Corn
Crude Oil
Deutschemark
Eurodollar
RPR
6.5227
(0.736)
-0.1187
(0.070)
-3.2065
(0.458)
<5g Gold
<5iq Heating Oil
S ii Japanese Yen
6 12 Swiss Franc
S 13 Sugar
Slii Silver
5]_5 Soy Bean
<S 16 S&P 500
<S^7 Treasury Bond
&1Q Wheat
Tests of coefficient restrictions:
p 2 = . . . = pj = p 18 =
5j = . . . = ik = 5M =
(Standard errors in parentheses.)
12.22
NA
SPREAD
6.6044
(0.640)
-0.4645
(0.215)
-3.1468
(0.458)
Coefficient Restriction: oto-O
RPR SPREAD
12.26
NA
7.2173
(1.450)
-0.1335
(0.065)
17.33
8.93
6.8447
(1.373)
-0.4453
(0.201)
-7.7889
-5.5372
(10.584) (10.626)
-11.4340
-10.6305
(6.677) (6.627)
-3.0370
-3.5746
(2.032) (2.027)
-3.5078
-3.3578
(2.164) (2.167)
-5.6660
-5.8975
(2.118) (2.118)
-3.4674
-3.2741
(0.862) (0.868)
-29.4419
-29.3113
(7.365) (7.358)
-1873.62
-1911.14
(261.08) (261.16)
-4.9219 -4.9800
(7.936) (7.927)
-3.9239
-3.8797
(0.935) (0.934)
-47.4932
-43.6372
(17.218) (17.294)
-23.5832
-23.0859
(11.202) (11.191)
-1.5328
-1.5380
(0.647) (0.647)
-1.3621
-0.1981
(6.347) (6.345)
-17.1179
-16.6645
(6.182) (6.187)
-22.3409
-21.1606
(6.223) (6.184)
-14.5535
-12.7488
(10.367) (10.352)
-6.5590
-6.1514
(3.710) (3.703)
17.07
8.73
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